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Borrowing Behavior  under Financial
Stress by the Proprietary Firm:
A Theoretical Analysis
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This paper extends  finance theory  under risk to account for borrowing behavior under
financial  stress  conditions.  As the financial stress level for the firm increases,  the role
of credit or unused borrowing capacity  changes.  With a strong equity position,  credit
is valued as a reserve to avoid liquidation costs resulting from the sale of fixed assets
to meet cash flow obligations. As the financial  stress on the firm increases  the model
demonstrates the firm's willingness to reduce credit reserves and increase  its financial
leverage in order to increase  its probability of survival.  These results  are derived in a
tractable  framework by describing  risky alternatives in terms of expected  values and
variances.
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A basic principle of finance for the single inves-
tor  in  a proprietary  firm  is that  increases  in
financial  leverage  will  increase  the  expected
level and variability of  returns to the investor's
equity  capital  (e.g.,  Francis  and Archer;  Van
Home).  Optimal leverage then depends on the
investor's attitude  toward risk as  reflected  by
the  properties  of his utility  function  and  the
level and variability of returns. Moreover,  op-
timal leverage will change as changes  occur in
expected returns, interest costs, variances, and
risk attitudes (Robison and Barry  1977; Adler;
Levy).  If, for  example,  a permanent  increase
in  the  variance  of returns  occurs,  then  one
plausible response is to reduce leverage. How-
ever,  a  different  response  may  occur  in  the
short  run if the  greater  risk,  combined  with
high  cash  flow  obligations,  jeopardizes  the
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Financial leverage is defined as the use of debt capital and other
fixed-obligation  financing relative to the use of  equity capital. The
positive  effect  on  expected  returns  assumes,  of course,  that  the
returns on assets exceed the cost of borrowing.
firm's  survival  and  pushes  it  toward  bank-
ruptcy. In  this case,  it is neither unusual nor
irrational to observe incentives for greater bor-
rowing as a short-term response to risk. A cur-
rent example is the use of additional  borrow-
ing,  debt  restructuring,  and  other  financial
responses to risk by financially stressed farmers
in the United States.
In this article,  we extend finance theory un-
der uncertainty  to account for borrowing  be-
havior under  financial  stress  conditions,  em-
phasizing  the  increased  use  of credit  when
survival  is at stake.  The major  purpose  is to
highlight the "go for broke" phenomenon that
arises  from  a willingness  to  incur greater  fi-
nancial risk as the proprietary  firm's survival
is threatened.  The  risk-averse  investor's  ob-
jective is expressed in terms of expected utility
maximization where equity  capital is the ob-
ject of utility  and  the  essential  properties  of
equity capital are the expected value and vari-
ance  of its  earnings.  Because  financial  stress
conditions are complex,  we begin by deriving
the proprietary  firm's  optimal borrowing  be-
havior under perfect market conditions. Then
we introduce market imperfections arising from
asset  liquidation  costs  and  financial  con-
straints and show the impacts of these factors
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on borrowing behavior with and without pos-
sible bankruptcy.  We conclude by considering
the empirical implications  of the analysis.
Our analysis  is related to, yet  differs from,
the  financial analysis  of large  corporate  firms
in which highly efficient markets exist for trad-
ing equity claims. Typically, the corporate goals
in those studies focus  on financial and invest-
ment policies which maximize the present val-
ue of a corporation's  wealth. In the latter case,
the propositions of Modigliani and Miller sug-
gest that the firm's value is independent  of its
capital structure.
Other  studies have  examined  the financial
and investment policies of corporations under
imperfect  capital  market conditions.  In  such
studies,  transactions  costs may occur  as a re-
sult of liquidation costs,  tax policies,  or bank-
ruptcy law limitations on liability (Kim, Chen
and Kim; Haugen and Senbet; Galai and Ma-
sulis; Scott; Kraus and Litzenberger).  The gen-
eral conclusions of these corporate investment
studies  are  generally  well  known  and  sum-
marized in leading financial textbooks such as
Brealey  and Myers.  Their conclusions  are (a)
as  the  potential  for  paying liquidations  costs
increases,  borrowing  decreases;  and (b) if the
corporation  can shift its borrowing risks  as a
result  of bankruptcy  laws that  limit liability,
then optimal borrowings increase.
This  study  generally  supports  those  de-
scribed above. Moreover, we extend the results
of the earlier studies in several ways. First, we
focus on the proprietary firm maximizing the
expected utility of ending period wealth.  Sec-
ond, this study focuses on how a credit reserve
or borrowing limit influences  the behavior of
the proprietary firm.  This inventory of poten-
tial borrowings along with the liquidity of firms'
assets  play  a critical  role for the investment
and financial behavior of proprietary firms that
make  up  much  of commercial  agriculture  in
the U.S. and elsewhere.
Optimal Borrowing  under Uncertainty:
No Constraints
The  derivation  of optimal  borrowing  under
uncertainty  with  no  financial  constraints  is
based on the following assumptions.  The ma-
jor source of risk is the random return,  r + e,
earned on a risky asset A,  where e is a random
variable with mean zero and variance a2. Asset
Ao  is  a divisible  durable that lasts  beyond  a
single period and can be acquired in any quan-
tity. The interest rate i paid on debt capital Do
is known with certainty, and the beginning pe-
riod accounting  identity A,  = Do  + Eo must
be met, where Eo is the beginning equity cap-
ital.  Finally, the investor's  risk attitude is ex-
pressed  as  a desired  tradeoff (X)  between  the
expected  level  and variance  of end-of-period
equity capital.
Thus, the investor seeks a level of debt that
maximizes the  expected  utility of ending  eq-
uity, E1, defined as the sum  of the beginning
equity Eo plus  net profit  (AdE)  earned  during
the  period.  This  objective  is  equivalent  to
maximizing the expected value-variance  mod-
el in equation  (1):2
(1)  Max EU(E,) = E(E,) - (X/2)a2(EM),
where E is the expectations  operator. In turn,
ending equity  (Eo + AE) is defined  as the re-
turn  on assets  less the cost of debt less with-
drawals  Wd for  consumption  and  other  pur-
poses.
(2)  E(E 1)  = (1 +  r)A,  - (1 + i)D, - Wd.
Variance  of ending equity is
(3) a
2
(E 1) =  arAo.
Substituting  (2)  and (3)  along  with the  ac-
counting identity, A, = Do + E,, into (1) yields
the expected utility model:3
(4)  Max EU(E,) = r(D, + Eo) - iD, + E,
- Wd-  (X/2)(Do + Eo)2ar.
Considering the level of debt as the decision
variable, the first-order condition is found by
differentiating  (4):
2 It can be shown that the mean-variance model in equation (1)
is  consistent  with  the  expected  utility  model  under  completely
general  conditions when the  choice  is between  alternative  com-
binations of a risky and safe asset because all possible choices are
EV  efficient.  Then  any  particular  solution  (e.g.,  the  one  which
maximizes  EU(EI)) can be found by the  appropriate  choice of X.
Thus, the expected value variance  model and a more general  ex-
pected utility model will yield the same solutions.  Additional  dis-
cussion  and justification  for the  EV  model's  use  as an expected
utility-maximizing model are provided in Meyer and Robison and
Robison  and Barry  (1986).  Robison  and Barry  (1986,  chap.  16)
also use the mean-variance model and the results of  an earlier draft
of this paper to explain  borrowing behavior under  stress.
3  Notice in  (4) that the investor may save at the risk-free rate  i.
Savings  occur  in the  model  as negative  values  of D,.  If all  the
equity were "saved,"  with no leveraging,  then the right-hand side
of (4) would become (1 + i)Eo. The lower bound on D, is E, since
savings are limited to the amount of equity. But  since the interest
rates on borrowing and "saving"  are  equal, no incentive exists to
borrow solely to invest in savings.
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(5)  dED)  =  (r-  i)-  X(D,  +  Eo)a  =  0.
dDo
Equating  (5)  to  zero and  solving for Do gives
optimal debt of
(6)  Do  - Er .
-aE,
Thus,  optimal debt in the unconstrained  case
depends on the investor's risk attitude as well
as on expected returns, interest costs, variance,
and beginning equity. Moreover, comparative
static results for this model show that optimal
debt  is  positively  related  to  changes  in  ex-
pected returns  on assets and inversely  related
to changes in costs of borrowing, equity,  vari-
ance of returns,  and risk aversion  (Barry,  Ba-
ker,  and  Sanint).  This  is shown  by  differen-




dDo  1 -D  > 0
dr  Xar
dDo  -- 1
di  X<0 di;  XaFf 2
do (6c)  -1<0
dEo
(6d)  --  <
dX  X2ar2
dDo  i-  r
(6e)  d  - <  0.
df2  X(U(2)
2
The one-to-one trade-off between debt  and
equity in (6c) is consistent with the condition
of constant  absolute risk  aversion.  It implies
that increasing wealth  (Eo) allows  a reduction
in  risk-free  debt  while  holding  constant  the
level  of risky  assets.  Holdings  of risky  assets
would only increase with increases in equity if
risk aversion  (X) decreases  or  if some  other
parameter value  changes accordingly.
Introducing Liquidation Costs  and
Constraints on Credit and Cash Flows
The analysis  now is generalized  by including
the  effects  of asset liquidation  costs and  con-
straints on borrowing capacity and cash flows.
The beginning period borrowing constraint for
the  proprietary  firm  is  expressed  as  a maxi-
mum limit (a) on the debt-to-equity  ratio:
(7)  Do < aEo,
or, alternatively,  as
(8) C,  =  aE, - D,,
where Co is the unused borrowing capacity held
in reserve.
The asset liquidation  cost,  p,  separates  the
asset's acquisition price, A,, from its sale price,
(1  - p)A,,  and,  for p  >  0,  identifies  an  asset
as  fixed.4 This  liquidation  cost also  interacts
with the borrowing constraint to itself impose
a limit  on indebtedness.  This  occurs because
the lender takes the liquidation cost into con-
sideration when determining the firm's credit
limits. Because the recoverable value of assets
pledged as loan collateral is (1 - p)A,, the lend-
er requires  the  firm  to have sufficient  equity
to cover these costs. 5
The cash flow constraint represents the firm's
capacity  to meet  its  known  financial  obliga-
tions,  based  on the  returns earned  from  the
risky  assets.  A positive  cash  flow  allows  the
firm to service its debt commitments  success-
fully and to provide for consumption and other
withdrawals.  A negative  cash  flow,  however,
triggers the need for either additional borrow-
ing from the unused credit reserves or partial
liquidation of assets.
A critical factor, then, in the firm's liquidity
position is the random outcome e  and its effects
on  cash flow.  Following  the development  in
the preceding section,  the firm's change in eq-
uity, AE which depends  on E,  is expressed as
(9)  AE = (r +  - i)D,  + (r + e)E,  - Wd.
In equation  (9),  the  firm experiences  the  sto-
chastic outcome e after it has borrowed amount
4 Assets, of course, vary in their degree of fixity. As a result, each
class  of assets may  have  a different  liquidation  value  p.  In  our
simple model with only one  kind of risky asset, there is only one
liquidation parameter p.
5 With liquidation  costs,  the maximum  limit on debt is  found
as follows:
Da  =  (1  - p)Ao
Substituting for A, gives
Dm,  = (1 - p)(Dm,  +  E).
Then, solving  for D,,na
(1  p)Eo.
P
If borrowing  is  less  than  Dm,,, unused  borrowing  capacity,  Co,
exists:
(1  p-  )E, Co=  D,.
This expression for Co is the same as given earlier in the text, thus
implying that a has  a value of (1-  p)/p.
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Do. If the level  of e yields a positive  change in
equity which  is used to reduce its debt,  then
the cash flow requirement is satisfied and cred-
it  reserves  in  the  next  period  will  increase.
However,  if the  level  of e yields  a  negative
change in equity, then additional borrowing or
asset liquidation  must occur.  Since the liqui-
dation of assets  is costly,  it  is plausible  that
the firm will first utilize unused borrowing ca-
pacity as  a  source  of liquidity  and  then con-
sider asset liquidation.  In turn, the change  in
borrowing  changes  the credit reserve  expres-
sion in (8) to
(10)  (Do  - AE)  + C, = a(EO + AE).
Under these conditions,  the level of eo  that
forces the firm to fully deplete its credit reserve
causes  the value  of C 1 in (10)  to equal  zero.
This level of e  is found by specifying  (9)  as
(11)  AE(E,)  = (r + E,  - i)D  + (r + Eo)E,  - Wd.
Substituting (11)  into  (10) with  C 1 = 0 and
solving for eo yields
D  - aEo  Wd+  iDo
(12)  E= (1  + a)(D, + E)  Do + EO
If outcome EC  exhausts both the firm's credit
and its equity, then bankruptcy  occurs.  How-
ever, if the credit constraint  is conservatively
set  so that  equity is not driven  to zero, then
the firm can continue to function  after partial
liquidation. For now, we will assume that out-
come  Eo  does not cause bankruptcy.
The probability  distribution for e is  shown
in figure  1. Since  E,  exhausts  credit,  then any
lower outcomes  (e < e0) will trigger partial liq-
uidation of assets. In turn, partial liquidation
reduces  the  firm's  equity  and  thus  increases
the probability of an e occurring in subsequent
periods that exhausts credit.  Moving  eo to the
left reduces  the probability  that the  firm will
be forced to liquidate assets. Moving  E 0 to the
right increases the probability that the firm will
be  forced  to  liquidate  assets.  In  terms  of
expression (12),  increasing i or Wd moves e, to
the right, while increasing  r, E0, or a moves Eo
to the left. However, increasing Do has an am-
biguous effect on Eo.
Accounting  for  the  simultaneous  effects  of
all these variables on e0 would yield a complex
theoretical  model.6 Thus,  we adopt a simpli-
6 Burghardt and Robison describe a computer simulation model
which examines borrowing behavior in a much more complicated
framework.  Here,  however,  the focus  is  on the theoretical  prop-
erties of the model.
fying,  yet  perhaps  more realistic  assumption
that the stochastic outcome which triggers liq-
uidation  is based on predetermined values  of
the  other variables  which  is  defined  here  as
eO.7  Thus, the firm's initial level of borrowing
in the present period still is limited by its liq-
uidity characteristics and equity, as expressed
in  (9).  However,  additional  credit to cover a
negative cash flow is available only if  the actual
rate of return exceeds  a minimum  of r - E*,
as  established  by the  lender.  If e is  less than
the  lender-specified  e*,  then asset liquidation
occurs  to cover the cash deficit.
Borrowing  Behavior  and the Liquidation
Model
Before  solving  the  model  for  optimal  data,
expressions  for the expected  value and  vari-
ance  of ending equity must be found that in-
clude  the  effects  of liquidation  costs  and  the
financial  constraints.  First,  consider  the  ex-
pected value of ending equity. If AE(e*) is the
outcome level that exhausts credit, then worse
outcomes  AE(E  <  e*)  will require  asset liqui-
dations  to cover  the  cash deficit.  Moreover,
the amount of the liquidated assets will exceed
the cash deficit due to liquidation cost p. This
is shown as follows,  where  AAo is the amount
of liquidated assets:
(13)  (1 - p)AAo  = AE(eo*)  - AE(e  < E*).
Liquidation cost pAAo is found by dividing
(13) by 1 - p and multiplying  by p:
(14)  pAl  =  [(1  E([AE(*) - AE(e  <  e*)].
The expected value of the liquidation  cost  is
then found by replacing e, with e* in (11) and
by  substituting the result  along with  (9)  into
(14) and integrating the difference in (14) over
the range of e <  E*.  The result is
(15) E[pAo] =  (  1  p  (  - )
-(1- p)J  J--
(Do + E,)f(c) d
=  1  [o  *F(c*)  - e]
(Do  + Eo),
7 Specifying  a  predetermined  lender  limit  on  asset  returns  is
plausible since lenders  must make  credit decisions  based  on ex-
pected outcomes in the context of a firm's current  financial struc-
ture that,  in turn, is based on  past experiences.
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Figure 1.  A probability distribution for E with
the credit exhaustion outcome  equal to e*
where  J  (E)  d =  .
t-0oo
Since the expected value  of e is zero, then e
which is a partial expectation of E  over the left
tail values must be negative.  Moreover,  since
e  represents  values of e that are  less  than e*,
but weighted  by the  same  probability  as  e*,
then  [c*F(o) - >]  >  0,  and the expected liq-
uidation cost in (15)  is positive.
Now, a new expression is formulated for the
expected  value  of ending  equity,  E(E1); it  is
equivalent to expression  (2) less the expected
liquidation  cost,  where  p/(l  - p)  is replaced
by (l/a).
(16)  E(E 1)  {r - F(e)  -
·(D  + E)  - iD  + E  - Wd.
The variance  of ending equity  is found by
separating the expression for E, into constants,
that can be ignored,  and functions  of the ran-
dom  variable  E, both  defined  for  outcomes
above and below e*. If we let y be what remains
after removing the constants,  then y is
e  (Do + E,)  e > e*
(17)  y  =[  _  +E()  )
E +  (Do  + EoE)  < E*
and its expected value is
(18)  E(y) = (  +E(Do  +  E)[-F(  *)]
The variance  of y,  o- 2, is written as
(19a) =  (Do  + Eo)
2%,
where a
2 =  n2  + a  + 2ol. The term a  is vari-
ance  of income  associated  with  liquidation
costs  and  aor  is the covariance  between liqui-
dation costs and the random return e.  The terms
oa  and arl can be written as
(19b)  a2 = {  - 2e*  + o*2F(E*)
- [e - o*F(*)] 2 }/oa2,  and
(19c)  rl  = 
0
-2  -*,
where a  =  e
2f(E) de. For later use, we de-
_00
r°o
fine a  = J  E 2f()  de where  cr  +  r 2 = c2.
Given the variance expressions in (19a), the
objective function  with liquidation costs is
(20)  Max EU(E)  =  r - [()  - ]}
*(Do + Eo)  - iDo-  E
- ,-  (Do +  Eo)
s.t. Do  < aE,.
If the  objective  is to maximize the difference
between expected wealth and variance  where
the trade-offbetween  the two equals X/2,  then
optimal  debt is  found by differentiating  (20)
with respect to Do,  equating the result to zero
and solving for Do:
{  [E*-F(e*)--] -
[ a
(21)  Do=  2---  Eo.
Compared to the optimal debt without  the
possibility  of liquidation  costs,  solved  for  in
equation  (6),  Do in (21) will be less since  liq-
uidation  costs are positive and  i2 >  a2.8
The variables  r, i, X,  and  * 2 all have  effects
similar  to those in the  perfect  market model
of expression  (6);  however,  the  limit,  a, on
leverage enters (21) directly and influences op-
8 It can be shown that o-2  > a2by demonstrating that  ,rl  > O.  To
demonstrate a,/ >  0, define el  as
? -o*
e,  =  ao
0
E <  e
f  >  fo
Then a,, can be written as
(
,
rl = 1  - E  o-  + Eo*F(Eo*)]JE) de
[cc-  E*F(E*)]E(E)  de
I=  J  e(  - E*)f(e)  de.
Consider  two cases.  If E*  <  O, then e and (E - e*)  are negative,
while the product is positive and a, > 0. If E*  >  0, then  -r,  can be
written as
Ir  = 
2
- Ee  >  0  since e  <  0.
Therefore, a-2.  =  -
2
+ 0-2 +  2or,  >  -2.
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timal debt even if borrowing has not reached
the limit. Moreover, an increase in the leverage
limit a increases the expected value of ending
equity and decreases its variance.  The net re-
sult is an increase in optimal debt (dDo/da >
0)  for investors  with  constant  or  decreasing
absolute risk aversion.  But if e* increases, the
expected  ending  equity  decreases  while  the
variance  of ending equity increases and Do de-
creases
[F(EO)  Ca
dDo  LaX  C (22)  -<  0,
where  { } is the braced  expression in the nu-
merator in (21).  The sign in (22) is unambig-
uously negative  since d2  /a*  >  0.9 This  re-
sponse is consistent with intuitive expectations,
since  increasing  E*  increases  the variance  of
liquidation costs.  Moreover,  introducing liq-
uidation costs into the analysis shows the im-
portance  of unused  borrowing  capacity  as  a
risk response.
Borrowing Behavior  and Possible  Bankruptcy
Now the condition that bankruptcy is unlikely
is relaxed  and we consider its effects  on bor-
rowing behavior.  This essentially defines a new
outcome  ,o  which is low enough to drive the
firm's equity capital to zero. Moreover, to sim-
plify the development, it is also assumed that
liability is limited to the borrower's equity. As
the  analysis  will  show,  the  results  yield  the
9 To  show that da
2 / /de* > 0,  which is required  to  sign (22),  we
write
-2, =2 +  J  [e - * - +  e*F(*)]
2f()  d
0  0
+  [i*F(e*) - E]
2f() d
+-  e(e  - e*)f(e) de
oa  -oo
de*  (=2Fe*)[1  - F(E*)I[E*F(*)  -e]
dE*  \02j
2
- -e>  ,
a
since  e*F(*) - >  0  and  e < 0.
The  last term in the derivative  of (22)  needing to be signed  is
- aF(*  )  F  +  (  /
This, however, can be easily signed by recognizing that
oe  e*dF(e*)
de*  e*  '




Figure 2.  The cumulative probability density
function  for a firm  facing  bankruptcy at out-
come  Eo
plausible  condition that  increased  borrowing
is a rational  and appropriate  response  in the
short run to forestall bankruptcy.
Allowing a "declaration of bankruptcy" sig-
nificantly alters the firm's choice set. Figure 2
shows  the  cumulative  probability  distribu-
tions for E1 with and without the possibility
of bankruptcy. The distribution beginning with
the dotted tail describes the no bankruptcy case.
Since bankruptcy  eliminates  outcomes below
Eo,  the distribution beginning at point  ,o  with
the  solid  line  reflects  the  cumulative  proba-
bility density  function  with bankruptcy  pro-
visions. The truncated distribution which be-
gins  at  point  ,o  has  a lower  variance  and  a
higher  expected  value  than  the old  distribu-
tion; thus it is less  risky than the old one. As
a result, the investor's  optimal debt should be
expected to increase in the short run and the
responses of debt to changes in exogenous cash
requirements  should differ as well.
In  formulating  the bankruptcy  model,  the
assumption is made that bankruptcy outcome
Eo  is  determined  exogeneously.  In  effect,  the
borrower (or lender) decides that rate of return
r - Eo is so unacceptable,  given the state of the
firm, that recovery is impossible.  To form the
objective  function,  we  must first find the ex-
pected level and variance of ending equity. The
variance calculation is simplified by expressing
variance  as the sum of the variance of a ran-
dom variable plus a constant.  Thus, E1 is ex-
pressed as:
(r  + e)(Do  + Eo )
23  -J  -iD,  - Wd+  Eo
(23)  - (r +  ,)(D,  + E)
- iD,  - Wd  + E,
> E
e  <  e
The constant  in (23)  is r(Do  +  E)  - iDo  -
Wd  + Eo.  Let the remainder be random vari-
able z:
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z = JE(Do + Eo)  e >  o
e,(Do  +  Eo)  E
whose expected value is
(24)  E(z) = [VF(o)  - i](Do  + E),
where  E(E)  de =  .
Note the difference between  oF(io)  and  . For
0o  < 0, EoF(o) is negative.  Since  e  is more  neg-
ative than  ^F(ei), as indicated above, the term
EoF(o)  - E  is positive.
The variance term for z is equal to
(25)  r




- (oF(o)  - )2
= (Do  + Eo)
where  a^  < o
2 is the transformation  of a?  be-
cause of liability limits due to bankruptcy laws
and where  a2 =J  e2 f(E) de. 10
-00
The objective function  is now found  as
(26)  Max EU(E,) = [r + eF(eo)  - -](Do  + E)
- iD  - Wd+  E
-(2)  (Do + E)
2 O
s.t.  Do < aE0 .
Optimal debt is derived as
r + ioF(e4)-  - i
(27)  Do  - Eo Xa 2
-
s.t. Do < aEo.
The effects of  truncating the distribution due
to bankruptcy  considerations  are  to increase
the  expected  return  and reduce  the variance
from investments in the risky assets.  Expected
returns increase  because  [o^F(eo)  - i]  > 0.
Another significant result is that the lender-
imposed credit constraint  does not appear in
the equation for optimal debt. The credit con-
straint does place an upper bound on the firm's
borrowings but has no other effect on the firm's
response to possible bankruptcy.
The responses of optimal Do to changes  in
r, X, i, and E0 are similar to the responses  in
previous models. Moreover, an increase in Wd
affects  Do through  its effects  on X. As  Wd  in-
creases, the firm's risk-free wealth decreases so
10  It can be shown that ao <  ar
2 by the procedures similar to those
used to show that a20  > a
.
that Do decreases for investors with decreasing
absolute risk  aversion (that is, for dX/dWd  <
0).
The most significant result for this analysis
is the response of Do to changes in Zo.  Optimal
debt for the borrower  increases  as the proba-
bility of bankruptcy increases. In practice, bor-
rowing often does increase as long as the lender
is willing  to supply the additional  funds.  In-
creasing  eO  causes  a  greater  truncation  of the
distributionf(E) in the left tail, making the dis-
tribution more compact and "less risky."  Con-
sequently,  the expected return on risky  assets
increases and variance decreases. In turn, these
effects  increase  the  likelihood  of bankruptcy
but also provide the incentives for greater bor-
rowing  and  increased  leverage,  at least  until
the  lender  terminates  financing,  or until  the
events leading  to the  bankruptcy  conditions
have  changed.
Concluding  Comments
In this  article,  we have  explored  the propri-
etary  firm's  borrowing  behavior  under  three
sets of conditions. The first model derived op-
timal debt in a perfect financial market based
on the combined  effects  of risk aversion,  ex-
pected  returns  and variances  of risky  assets,
and the cost of borrowing.  The second model
introduced imperfect asset markets represent-
ed by liquidation costs for risky assets, leverage
and cash flows,  and the use of credit reserves
to avoid  liquidation  costs.  The  third  model
considered the  effects  of possible bankruptcy
on borrowing  behavior.  An  important  theo-
retical result is the incentive  to increase bor-
rowing as a means of forestalling  bankruptcy,
which  is consistent  with  the  "go  for broke"
financial  behavior  often  exhibited  by highly
stressed borrowers.  The increased  borrowing
reflects the use of liquid credit reserves to see
a firm through  adversity by such practices  as
carrying  over loans,  deferring payments,  refi-
nancing high-debt loans, or otherwise utilizing
those  reserves  during  times  of financial  dis-
tress.
Clearly, the analysis  in this  article has  not
treated  all  of the  issues  associated  with  the
management  of credit reserves  as a source  of
liquidity.  Nor have we treated all the possible
responses to risk that the firm might undertake
to raise itself out of a difficult financial  situa-
tion. But we have attempted to establish a the-
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oretical  framework  for  explaining  a  propri-
etary  firm's  borrowing behavior  under  stress
conditions so that extensions to more complex
decision situations may occur. This should en-
hance the understanding  of holding liquid re-
serves  of credit  and  financial  assets  as  a re-
sponse to risk and provide a richer framework
for empirical analyses of borrowing behavior.
[Received March 1986; final revision
received June 1987.]
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